

Analysis of the Domain of necessity of the Ignorant Guidance in Laws and Subjects

Abdollah Omidifard¹, Marzieh Pilevar²

¹Associate Professor of Qom University, ²PhD student in Jurisprudence and Foundations of Law, Qom University

Abstract

According to the Rule of Guidance, it is necessary to guide ignorant in principles of religion and divine beliefs and legal sentences. In view of scholars, guidance of ignorant is among obligatory religious orders and lots of verses and narratives are referred to prove that. However, in field of necessity of guidance to subjects, there are some disputes among scholars and majority of them believe that the necessity of evidences of rule of guidance is necessity of guidance in ignorance to order and there is no evidence on necessity of guidance in subjects and even some scholars has banned it in case of annoyance of the ignorant as a result of notification or falling in distress and problem. However, guidance in important subjects such as life and honor is exempted from this order and guidance is necessary and binding in such cases.

Key words: Domain, Guidance, Laws, Religion

INTRODUCTION

One of the most popular worships for God is trying to guide the ignorant when getting ignorance in disbelief or ignorance in religious orders or ignorance in corruptions. Knowledgeable and wise people are responsible for attempting to guide the ignorant and do their best in this field. However, the obligatory order in some cases is necessity and is recommended (Mostahab) in some cases. It is necessary for the wise person to guide ignorant in any way possible.

CONCEPTS

Concept of Guidance (Ershad)

Rshd (growth) lexically means being guided and "Ershed" (guide) means guiding someone (Ghasemi, 2009, 148). Sheikh Toosi believes that guidance refers to the way of growth (1988, vol.1: 41). Guidance (Ershad) lexically means guiding someone and as it in term means same

lexical meaning, no special definition in terms is presented for that and majority of scholars use it as guidance for worldly and hereafter expediency and goodness. Even the term "guidance" refers to determination (Gerges, no date, vol.1: 133). In juridical proeses, guidance mostly is used as possessive term for the ignorant in fields such as cleanness, uncleanness and transactions. As the term "guidance" is not given in religious proeses (Quran and Sunnat) and the "ignorant guidance" is given in no evidence, this term is considered lexically as guiding and training and informing. Hence, in juridical texts, terms such as notification, promotion and education are used as alternative term for "guidance". Sometimes in words of scholars, the term "ignorant guidance" is also interpreted as "ignorant education"; which means same guiding.

According to the rule of "Necessity of Ignorance Guidance", it is the responsibility of the wise people to guide ignorant to learn religious lessons. According to some scholars, the rule is also interpreted as "necessity of notification of ignorant to the wise person" (Ayatollah Mostafavi, Ma'e al-Qaeda al-Fiqahi, p.23). Therefore, guidance refers to education and also includes notification.

Notification means just informing; meaning that a person is uninformed and then is informed by a notification. However, in some cases, the person is ignorant and is not

Access this article online



www.ijss-sn.com

Month of Submission : 03-2017
Month of Peer Review : 04-2017
Month of Acceptance : 05-2017
Month of Publishing : 06-2017

Corresponding Author: ???

informed by notification and warning and needs education like worshipping and saying prayer, which need education.

In majority of religious texts, in field of orders, the term “education” is used and the term “notification” is used in field of subjects. Hence, it could be mentioned that the aim by guidance is education in orders and notification in subjects.

Moreover, the concept of guidance also encompasses reminding and the reminding is sometimes for the person, who has neglected something or a person, who has forgotten. In this case, reminding the ignorant in the domain of rule of guidance is accepted; especially if the ignorance is considered as its general meaning (encompassing the ignorant).

Concept of Ignorance

Some philologists have translated ignorance the opposite point of knowledge or the contradictory point of knowledge (Ibn Manzur, no date, vol.129: 11).

Ragheb Isfahani has divided ignorance to 3 classes:

- 1- Human soul is free from knowledge as the most important meaning of ignorance
- 2- Belief in something despite to what is in reality
- 3- Taking an action contrary to what should be taken; whether it is regarded right or false (1402: 209)

In juridical and legal texts, the term “ignorance” is mainly used in its lexical meaning; although the range of using this term is extended to subject or order that is doubted; meaning order and subject ambiguities. This is because; there is a kind of ignorance and unawareness in this case (Mozaffar, 1982, vol.4: 335).

In juridical and legal references, ignorance is divided to defamation (Qosuri) or fault (Taqhiri) ignorance. In defamation ignorance, the ignorant is under conditions that there is no access to legal orders and rules. In fault ignorance, the ignorant has the ability to use law and knowledge, but remains in ignorance because of negligence and failure (Ahmad Fat'hollah, 1994, vol.1: 137; Gharavi Tabrizi, 1989, vol.3: 343).

Another classification of ignorance, due to the ignored issue, is ignorance to order and subject. Ignorance of order means that the ignorant is unaware of order or law; and ignorance of subject means that the person is aware of legal and religious orders and is unaware of the subject. Another classification of ignorance is dividing it to excused (Mo'azar) and non-excused (na Mo'azar) ignorance. Non-excused ignorance means that the person can take no legal or hereafter excuse and reason; like ignorance of religious

beliefs and elements. On the contrary, excused ignorance is that the person should get no punishment; like ignorance of those Muslims out of Islamic territory; who are unaware of legal verdicts and orders (Saghnaghi, 2002, vol.4: 1724). Imami Fundamentalists have discussed on ignorance in different parts of jurisprudence such as commonality of sentences of ignorant and knowledgeable people. In their opinion, the ratio of ignorant and wise person is same based on divine sentences and that codification of legal sentence on knowledge of the obliged person is impossible. This is because; under such conditions, no sentence could be codified until the time that the obliged is aware of the sentences; although awareness of sentences could be realized after codification (Akhund Khorasani, 2002, vol.3: 12; Mozaffar, 1982, vol.3: 32). Fundamentalists have mentioned that necessity of reference to wise person by the ignorant to meet the ignorance and to learn legal orders is one of the evidences of permission of imitation (Taqlid) (Khorasani, *ibid*, 539; Mozaffar, *ibid*: 14) and that legal necessity is learning the sentences from accepted affairs by means of fundamentalist scholars. This is because; acting based on religious sentences is possible just through learning them and summarized knowledge about the sentences is also realized for everyone. Hence, it is necessary to learn them and ignorance of these orders and sentences can't be an excuse (Akhund Khorasani, *ibid*: 425; Ruhani, 1991, vol.3: 420).

The Domain of Rule of Guidance

In general, ignorance is divided to two parts: ignorance of order and ignorance of subject. In this section, the domain of necessity of rule of guidance in field of ignorance of orders and subjects is analyzed.

Guidance in Orders

Before presentation of rule of guidance in orders, it is necessary to analyze the obligation of obliged in ignorance of order.

Majority of jurists believe that there are common divine sentences between the wise person and ignorant and one evidence referred to prove the commonality of wise and ignorant is consensus (Khuyi, Mesbah Al-Osul, 96/2).

Moreover, Mozaffar has mentioned in the introduction of his 11 books of Principles of Jurisprudence: consensus of Imami jurisprudence is on this basis that the rules and orders of God are same and common for the wise and ignorant; it means that:

The order of God is fixed for his subject; whether the obliged is aware of that or is ignorant, and should act based on that order (113/2). However, he has referred to reason of wisdom to prove the orders between the wise and

ignorant and has said: reason understands that allocating order to the wise person is cancelled (30/2).

Therefore, according to the Imami Scholars, the Almighty God has some orders and sentences in the reserved book, which are always fixed, since they have been codified based on real materials and the sentences could be never changed and the real obligations are fixed for all obliged people. Hence, the wise and ignorant people are same in these sentences and other factors such as knowledge and ignorance could have no effect on the principle of fixed nature of real sentences. Therefore, the obliged is responsible for searching and investigating to find the real Divine sentences (Sadr, lessons on principles, 124/4; Hakim Tabataei, Montaghi Al-Osul, 386/4; Tabatabaei Hakim, Osul Al-Ammah, 74/3).

The verse “So ask the people of the message if you do not know” (An-Nahl/43) referring to asking about unknown things is one evidence to prove the necessity of learning legal sentences and guidance to general rational principles (necessity of reference of ignorant to wise) (Khuyi, Mesbah Al-Osul, 450/3; Khuyi, At-Tanghih, 88; Zehni Tehrani, Tahrir Al-Fosul, 1299/5).

Verse 122 of At-Tawbah “And it is not for the believers to go forth [to battle] all at once. For there should separate from every division of them a group [remaining] to obtain understanding in the religion and warn their people when they return to them that they might be cautious” refers to necessity of presence of at least one group and mentions that presence of a person or group is an introduction to education. Hence, the verse refers to necessity of education (Khuyi, Al-Ijtihad va Taqlid, 87; Mostafavi, Ma’e al-Qaeda al-Fiqahi, 46).

The main narratives (hadith) referred to prove the commonality are narratives referring to necessity of education and learning legal sentences and lack of inability of ignorant and attachment of ignorant to wise person.

In the narrative of Imam sadegh (PBUH): “education is an obligation for all Muslims and God loves seekers of knowledge” (Kalini Kafi, 30/1), loving seekers of knowledge is in fact encouraging people to go for learning. Although the term “love” has not referred to “necessity”, the term “education is obligation” refers to necessity of education. Moreover, the narrative of Ibi Al-Hassan (PBUH) “can people leave learning until they need that? And said God: No” (Horr Ameli, Vasael Ul-Shia, 220-12; Kalini Kafi, 34/1): Imam has forbidden leaving education and means that education is among necessities for people.

The narrative of Mofzal Bin Omar from Aba Abdollah (PBUH) “you need to learn things in religion” (Kalini Kafi, 31/1), necessity of education is evident.

On the other hand, in narrative of Abi Al-Hassan (PBUH) (Kalini, Kafi, 34/1) on forbidding asking question meaning that people are deprived from freedom and can’t remain on their ignorance; it is found that the ignorant is not excused (Bahreini, Hadaegh An-Nazerah, 86/2; Naeini, Favaed Al-Osul, 12/3).

Moreover, the narrative of Mohammad Bin Moslem from Abi Abdollah (PBUH) “those would be destroyed, who don’t know and don’t ask” (Kalini Kafi, 40/1) and narrative of Abi Jafar (PBUH) “there is no freedom for people until they ask what they don’t know” (Ibid) refer to this issue that leaving education and learning religious sentences will lead to punishment and destruction and this is enough to order for necessity of learning sentences.

As it was mentioned, there is no dispute among fundamentalists in terms of issue of learning rules of sharia; although they have dispute on the manner of necessity of learning sentences and in this field that whether necessity of education is obligatory or non-obligatory necessity and whether necessity of education is absolute or by guidance.

Some fundamentalists believe that education and seeking knowledge of sentences has obligatory necessity (Ruhani, Zobde Al-Osul, 365/1). Some scholars also believe that learning sentences is rational obligation and believe that although some news refer to necessity of learning sentences; it refers to guidance for rule of wisdom (Sheikh Ansari, Al-Musawa al-Fiqahi al-Maysara, 479/1) and some others believe that necessity of learning sentences is modal obligation (Naeini, Favaed Al-Osul, 44/3).

However, in regard with obligation of scholars to meet ignorance of the ignorant and guiding the ignorant, it should be mentioned that guidance is binding in case of ignorance of sentence; it means that notification of sentence to ignorant is necessary. Jurists have stipulated to necessity of teaching general sentences in various positions.

Sheikh Ansari says in this field: “necessity of guidance of ignorant is in ignorance of sentence but from that aspect that necessity of promotion is an obligation”. Therefore, the scholar and wise person is a promoter on behalf of God to end the mission against the ignorant, so that the capability of sin or obedience is created in that person (Makaseb, 77/1).

Researcher Arachi has also mentioned that necessity of guidance in general sentences is referred in the verse 122 of Tawbah and similar verses and has also claimed on consensus for that (Ta’liqa Estedlaliyah ala Orvat Al-Vosqa, 13).

Moreover, Ayatollah Khuyi believes that in general sentences of God, it is necessary to guide ignorant undoubtedly for necessity of promotion of legal sentences for people of next generation to the day of resurrection and believes that the necessity is referred in the verse 122 of Tawbah and the narratives on gaining knowledge and education (Mesbah Al-Fiqaha, 201/1).

Gharavi tabrizi says: guiding ignorant in terms of necessity of expression and promotion of legal sentences and preservation of sentences is necessary to prevent their destruction (At-Tangih, 379/3).

Moreover, in the discussion of respecting religious obligations, jurists have referred to necessity of guiding ignorant in sentences. Shahid Aval has said in “Dorus” that getting payment on obligatory education (explicit and sufficiency) on educating Quran and guidance of divine sentences is forbidden and illegal (172/3). Also, Shahid Sani has said in field of illegal jobs that getting payment on teaching obligations like Quran and sentences of worshipping and also promotion of religion and teaching religion to obliged people is forbidden and illegal (Ar-Roza Al-Bahiya, 218/3).

Moreover, Imam Khomeini says: affairs such as teaching sentences of god (on halal and haram) as obligations of human should be free and getting paid for them is illegal and forbidden (Tahrir Al-Vasileh, 499/1).

Ayatollah Mostafavi says: “guidance of ignorant should be in limit of guidance for general religious and divine sentences” (Ibid).

Guidance on Subjects

Before expression of sentence of guidance on subjects, it is necessary to know that what is the responsibility of obliged while ignorance of subject. Is the obliged responsible for executing caution or excuse in this case? Or the obliged should gain knowledge?

In view of Imam Khomeini, execution of rule of caution based on certain rules while ignorance on subject is allowed and there is no matter that the subject of condition or barrier. For example, someone, who doesn't know the direction of Qiblah, should say prayers in 4 directions; it means that if someone is unaware of subject, he/she should take caution. If someone has two clothes and doesn't know that which one is clean and which one is unclean, he/she should say prayers two times to prove that the prayer is said by clean clothes. In other words, the obliged in an overview is caution, since the conditions of saying prayers is finding Qiblah and being clean and knowledge and ignorance can't interfere in it. In case of

ignorance, the condition could not be cancelled (Tahzib Al-Osul, 327/2).

In the book “Orvat Al-Vosgha”, on uncleanness, it has been mentioned that violator of order has same sentence of ignorant in case of necessity of recourse. Hence, if the person says the prayer after washing the clothes, knowing that clothes is clean, and is informed after saying prayer that the clothes has been unclean, recourse and return is not necessary, since it is because of ignorance of subject.

The reason mentioned by owner of “Orvat Al-Vosgha” is that whenever we doubt on subject (ignorance of subject) and take that action, the action is right and it has no recourse. In other words, in ignorance of subject, there is no need to caution and there is the place of excuse and innocence (Sayed Kazem Yazdi, 30).

However, the author of “Kashef Ul-Qita” believes that legal and religious subjects are same sentences. Hence, as education in religious sentences is obligatory, education in subjects is also obligatory and the absolute Mujtahid (priest) should be referred to identify these subjects and religious sentences (Kashef Al-Qita, 19/4).

In regard with his opinion, it could be mentioned that the aim by subjects that gaining knowledge or caution in them is obligatory could refer to subjects with legal forgery and doubt in these subjects is in fact doubt in obligation and doubt in obligation is caution in terms of reason and narration and in other subjects; necessity of caution and education is not fixed and majority of scholars believe in innocence in subjective ambiguities.

Statements on Necessity of Guidance in Subjects

One of the main scholars in this field is Allameh Helli. In the book “Ajvabat Al-Masael Al-Mahnaeiah”, when he was asked to when a person is witness that another person makes a disruption in ablution or makes the ablution with unclean water or is saying prayers in unclean clothes, is it obligatory to inform that person? He asked that notification is necessary and is in field of virtue (48).

Moreover, Saheb Ma'alem has attributed claiming for necessity of guidance in subjects to some companions and says: some companions say that if two just people see an uncleanness in clothes or water of another person, notification may be obligatory for them, since avoiding uncleanness is obligatory and this sentence is focused on news in this field and it may not be obligatory, since avoiding uncleanness is obligatory in case that it is known and the obligation of ignorant is impossible. Then, he says that there is no doubt that reference of news on this issue is preferred (Zeinedin Ibn Shahid Sani, Ma'alem Ad-din,

579/2). In “Hada’egh An-Nazerah”, it has been attributed to some scholars that notification to Imam in regard with uncleanness of his clothes is obligatory (Sheikh Bahreini, 261/5).

Statements on Lack of Obligation of Guidance in Subjects

Claiming for lack of necessity of guidance in subjects is the selected statement of majority of scholars (Sheikh Bahreini, *ibid*, Sayed Kazem Yazdi, *Orvat Al-Vosgha*, 93/1; Tabatabaei Hakim, *Mostamsak Al-Orvat Al-Vosgha*, 523/1; Gharavi Tabrizi, *At-Tanghih*, 333/2).

This sentence is because of lack of evidence on necessity of notification in subjects. In other words, ignorance of subject is not among affairs included in evidences of necessity of doing good and forbidding evil. This is because; because of ignorance, the ignorant is not a doer of evil and on the other hand, the evidences of necessity of teaching religious sentences can’t encompass it. This is because; the person is aware of the sentence and is unaware of the subject and in addition, there are also some evidences referring to lack of necessity of notification and warning.

The main narratives in this field include narrative of Mohammad Bin Muslim from imam Bagher (PBUH): “he asked Imam about a man, who sees an uncleanness on clothes of another one while saying prayer; says Imam: say nothing until he gives up” (Horr Ameli, *Vasael ul-Shia*, 487/3). The other narrative is belonged to Abdollah bin Sanan from Imam Sadegh (PBUH) asking about a person, who has made ablution and another person says that a part of uncleanness is remained on his back and the ablution water has not reached that point; says Imam: what if he was silent? (Horr Ameli, *ibid*); another narrative is the narrative of Abdolah Bin Bakir from Imam Sadegh (PBUH) about a man borrowing clothes of another one with uncleanness on it and says Imam: there is no necessity for notification (Horr Ameli, *ibid*, 488).

It could be found from these hadiths that in field of subjects, the reality of others should not be annoyed for an excuse. Therefore, it is not necessary for the wise person to guide a person, who is not aware of something and doesn’t know that the subject is an example of Haram examples. This is because; the current deprivation has not made him involved and he is excused for his ignorance. Some scholars have mentioned that it is illegal to notify something, when it may lead to annoyance of the ignorant (Gharavi Tabrizi, *At-Tanghih*, 333/2; Salehi Mazandarani, *Meftah Al-Basirah*, 127/3).

In this regard, Ayatollah Khuyi says:

In cases that the real sentence can make no effect on the action of obliged in case of ignorance like the uncleanness

of clothes; there is no necessity for notification. This is because; the prayer of ignorant is not defected and both cleanness and uncleanness of clothes are charged for righteousness. Hence, the wise person has no obligation to warn the ignorant for such uncleanness.

When the real sentence has an effect; meaning that can affect the accuracy and failure of action regardless of knowledge and ignorance; the obliged is excused because of taking that action and hence, he guidance and notification is not obligatory in these cases and the reason is that in these cases, the necessity of doing good and forbidding evil is not adjusted (doing good and forbidding evil is true in cases of knowing something and doing evil). Also, necessity of promotion of religious sentences and guidance of ignorant could not be included in this field. This is because; such person is informed of the sentence and is ignorant just about the subject. Even the sentence of respect could be announced in cases that notification may cause annoyance of ignorant (Mesbah Al-Fiqaha, 160/1).

However, some jurists have considered exception for the sentence of lack of necessity of guidance in subjects of important affairs considering seriously by the legislator and have ordered for necessity of these subjects; affairs like blood and souls and dignity of the believers and the properties; on which the legislator is never satisfied to interfere; e.g. a person who thinks wrongly that another person is blood wasted and takes measure to kill him and guidance in such cases is absolutely obligatory (Abolghasem Khuyi, *ibid*, Mostafavi, *Ma Al-Qaeda Al-Faqihiah*, 48).

However, it could be mentioned in this field that reason in these affairs has independent order for necessity of meeting the harm. It means that the wisdom and reason orders that in these cases, the harm should be avoided. According to the rule of companionship of reason with law, the legislator has also paid special attention to these subjects and has claimed that guidance in these cases is obligatory to meet the harm.

The rule of meeting probable harm is among rational rules and its content is the order of wisdom to meet the probable harm. Hence, if a person thinks that a harm may be created by an action, meeting such harm is obligatory in terms of wisdom (Akhund Khorasani, 1991: 309). As necessity of meeting probable harm is a rational order, it could not be allocated and could be referred in various cases. The subject of rule of necessity of meeting harm is for cases that the harm is probable. It means that in cases that there is possibility of harm in worldly terms or there is possibility of punishment in hereafter world; the order of reason is meeting that harm necessarily. In other words, human reason orders to meet harm independently and

without reference to law. Hence, lots of jurists and scholars have interpreted this rule as a rational rule (Naeini, 1986, vol.3: 214; Khuyi, 1996, vol.2: 186).

The aim by meeting in this rule is preventing creation of probable harm and in view of majority of jurists, the aim by harm in this rule is the hereafter punishment harm (Fazel Lankarani, 2009, vol.11: 243). However, some scholars have interpreted harm in this rule as worldly probable harm (Heydari, 253: 2009). A notable issue in this rule is that what means the probable harm? In this regard, harm has at least 3 types:

Sometimes, harm is created for the person and sometimes, it is imposed on others and sometimes it is imposed on religion. Certainly, the clear example of this rule is meeting hereafter harm. However, as reason has independent sentence and as meeting probable harm from others is also obligatory; reason order to meet the harm in cases that life of someone is exposed to harm. Even in cases that there is strong probability of life or property loss of others, again reason orders independently for necessity of meeting harm. Also, if the hereafter world harm can be created in action of another person and the person can change his destiny through taking or leaving this action, reason orders for preventing such harm. Moreover, in cases that harm is imposed on religion and collapses pillars of religion, meeting such harm, whether certain or uncertain harm, is obligatory in terms of reason. In fact, it could be mentioned that the cause of sending prophets and divine missioners and their successors and jurists could be promotion of legal and religious orders and promotion of religion and guiding people to meet the worldly and hereafter harms from others. Researcher Bohrani says in this field: preventing harm imposed as a result of ignorance of divine sentences is obligatory due to reason (Ghava'ed Al-Maram, no date: 28). There are some affairs in Islamic sharia, in which the obliged needs to do or leave something in terms of belief and if he ignores that issue, he may encounter harm. For example, in the religious issues, a person may take a measure due to ignorance and leave Islam religion; such harm could never be compensated. Also, in ethical issues, the person may fall in illegitimate relations due to ignorance and continuing such relations can cause irrevocable harms for that person and others.

CONCLUSION

According to the comments of jurists in field of guidance of ignorant, it could be found that educating in religion and teaching the principles and rules of religion to the ignorant is sufficiency obligatory. Therefore, there is no doubt that guiding ignorant for the sentences is one of the main

obligations of jurists and regardless of abundant rewards and ablations for such action, it is an obligation and if it is interpreted as sentences, the aim is not just Halal and Haram, but also the aim is the wide range of introducing the religion and beliefs and religious sentences in addition to subjects.

The contemporary jurists have also ordered for necessity of guidance in sentences and majority of them have mentioned that guidance is an obligation for the obligations and prohibitions (Ayatollah Tabrizi; Ayatollah Majarem Shirazi; Ayatollah Safi; Golpaigani; Ayatollah Sistani; Ayatollah Fazel Lankarani and others). However, in regard with guidance of ignorant on subjects, it should be mentioned that in cases that the real sentences could not be effective in case of ignorance like the uncleanness of clothes; the notification is not necessary. On the contrary, if the real sentence is effective and can change something (meaning that it could be effective regardless of knowledge and ignorance in terms of accuracy and inaccuracy), the obliged could be excused for such action and hence, notification and guidance is not necessary in these cases and the reason is that in such cases, the necessity of doing good and forbidding evil is not adjusted (doing good and forbidding evil is true in cases of having knowledge and doing evil) and necessity of promotion of religious orders and guidance of ignorant is not also included in this field. This is because; such person has the knowledge about the sentence and is just ignorant to the subject. Even sometimes, the order of respect could be announced. In cases that notification may annoy the ignorant, it could be prohibited. However, affairs such as blood and souls and dignity of believers and the properties, in which the legislator is never satisfied to interfere (e.g. a person who finds another one wrongly as blood wasted and decides to kill that person), the guidance and notification is absolutely obligatory and necessary.

REFERENCES

1. Holy Quran
2. Ibn Manzur, Khalil Bin Ahmad (1988), Al-Ain, vol. 5, 8, 11, 12 and 13, Qom: Dar Ul-Hejrah Institute
3. Ansari (Sheikh), Morteza Bin Mohammad Amin, (2001), Al-Musawa al-Fiqahi al-Maysara, Qom: Center for Islamic Ideas
4. No name, (1999), Al-Makaseb, vol.1, Qom: publications of Center for Islamic Ideas
5. Bohrani Yusuf bin Mohammd, (1990), Hadaegh An-Nazerah fi Ahkam Al-Etrat at-Taheerah, vol.5, Tehran: Office for Islamic Publications
6. Bohrani Ibn Meysam, (1986), Ghava'ed Al-Maram fi Elm Al-Kalam, researcher: Hosseini Ashkuri, Qom: Library Publications of Ayatollah Mar'ashi Najafi
7. Jab'ei Ameli, (Shahid Sani), Zeinedin Bin Ali (2016), Ar-Rozat Al-Bahiyah fi Sharhe Lamha Damashqiya, vol.2,3, Tehran: Islamic Center
8. Jamaledin Bin Shahid Sani, Hassan Bin Sheikh (1983), Ma'alem Ad-din and Malaz al-Mojtahedin, vol.2, Tehran: Institute for Islamic Researches
9. Gerges Mohammad Bin Abdorahman (nodate), Ma'ajam Al-Mostalahat va

- Al-Alfaz Al-Fiqh, vol.1, Beirut: Center for Publishing Books
10. Johari Ismail Bin Ebad, (1987), *Taj al-loghat va Sahah Al-Arabiah*, vol.2, 4 and 5; Cairo: Center for Publishing Arabic Books
 11. No name, (1993), *Al-mohit fe Loghat*, Beirut: World of Books
 12. Horr ameli Mohammad Bin Hassan, (1988), *vasael Ul-Shia ela Tahsil Masael Al-Sharia*, vol. 3, 12, 15, 19, 24 and 27, Beirut: Center for Publishing Arabic Works
 13. Allameh Helli, Hassan Bin Yusuf (no date), *Ajvab Al-Masael Al-Mahnaiah*, Qom: institute for Al Bait researches
 14. No name (no date), *Nahayat Al-Ahkam fi Marefat Al-Ahkam*, vol.1, Qom: Ismailian Publishing Center
 15. Heydari (Allameh), Alinaghi (1999), *osul Al-Estenbat*, trans: A Zera'at, Tehran: Feiz Publications
 16. Khorasani (Akhund), Mohammad Kazem ibn Husain (2002), *Shaheyah Al-Asg*, Volume 3, Qom: Al-bait (AS) Research and Publishing Institute
 17. Khuyi, Seyyed Abolghasem (1982) *Misbah Al-Baghaha*, Vol. 1, Qom: Wajdani Publishing
 18. No name, (1996) *Mesbah Al-Aslif*, Volume 2 and 3, Tahrir Mohammad Vaeed al-Husseini, Qom: Maktabat al-Dawari
 19. Ragheb Isfahani, Abolqasim Hussein ibn Muhammad (1982) *Al-Furra al-Furriq al-Quran*, Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rafat al-Din
 20. Ruhani, Mohammad Sadegh (1992) *Zabdat al-Asg*, Volume 3, Qom: Publishing school of Imam Sadegh
 21. Saghnaqhi, Hossein ibn Ali (2002), in the study of the book *Al-Wafi al-Faql al-Fiqh*, Volume 4, Cairo: Nasar Al-Cairo
 22. Salehi Mazandarani, Ismail (2000); *Meftah al-Bassir al-Fayyah al-Sharia*, Qom: Salehan publication
 23. Sadr, Mohammad Baqir (1986) *Lessons in Philosophy*, Vol. 1, Qom: Encyclopedia of Al-Fiqh al-Islam
 24. Tabatabai Hakim, Seyyed Mohsen, (1984) *Mostamsak Al-Orvat al-Vosgha*, Qom: Maktab al-Sayed al-Marashi
 25. Tabatabaei Yazdi, Seyyed Mohammad Kazem (1998), *Al-Orvat Al-Vosgha fima Ta'am behi Al-Balwi*, Qom: Islamic Publications Office affiliated with Modarres Society
 26. Toosi, Mohammad ibn Hasan (1988), *Al-Tebian Fi Tafsir al-Quran*, Qom: School of A'alam al-Islam
 27. Ta'raqi (researcher), Zia'addin (1949), *the Suspension of the Argumentation of al-Orvat al-Vosgha*, Qom: Publication of the Community of Teachers of the Seminary
 28. Fazel Lankarani, Mohammad (2009) *Izah Al-Kefayah*, Volume 4, Qom: Islamic jurisprudential publication of the Imams
 29. Fathullah, Ahmad (1994) *Ma'jam Alfaz al-Fiqh al-Jafari*, Volume 1, Qom: Al-bait (AS) Research and Publishing Institute
 30. Ghasemi, An'am al-Haq (2009) *jurisprudence dictionary*, Torbat-e-Jam: Avaye Islam Publishing
 31. Qaklini, Mohammad ibn Ya'qub (1981) *Osul Al-Kafi*, volumes 1, 2, and 5, Beirut: Dar Sa'b and Dar Al-Ta'arof
 32. Majlesi (Allameh), Mohammad Baghir (1983) *Bihar Al-Anwar*, Volume 2 & 22 & 48, Beirut: Al-Wafa Institute
 33. Mostafavi, Seyyed Kazem (2011), *Ma'ta al-Qaeda al-Fiqhi*, translated by Azizullah Fahimi, Tehran: Mizan Press
 34. Mozaffar, Mohammad Reza (1982), *Osul Al-Fiqah*, Volume 1, 2, 3, and 4, Qom: The Ismailian Press Institute
 35. Musavi al-Khamini, Seyyed Ruhollah (1983), *Tahrir Al-Vasileh*, Volume 1 and 2, Qom: Darl al-Islam press institute,
 36. No name, (1988). *Tahzib Al-Osul: Sobhani Tabrizi*, Tehran: Institute for the regulation and publication of Imam Khomeini's works.
 37. Najafi, Mohammad Hassan (1984) *Javaher El-Kalam fi Shar'h Sharia al-Islam*, Volume 21, Beirut: Center for Arabic Works
 38. Yazdi, Mohammad Kazem bin Abdul Azim (1990), *Al-Tanghah Fi Shar'h Orvat Al-Vosgha*, Volume 2 and 3, with the narration of Ali Gharavi Tabrizi, Tehran: Lotfi publication

How to cite this article: Omidifard A, Pilevar M. Analysis of the Domain of necessity of the Ignorant Guidance in Laws and Subjects. *Int J Sci Stud* 2017;5(3):335-341.

Source of Support: Nil, **Conflict of Interest:** None declared.