The Role of Germany as a Third Power in Qajar Foreign Policy in Competition with Britain and Russia

Ahmad Fazli Nejad1, Abdol Rasul Kheir Andish2, Abed Akbari3
1Assistant Professor of History at the University of Shiraz, 2Professor of History at the University of Shiraz, 3The Author Nominated for a Doctoral Degree of History at Shiraz University

Abstract

The Third Power Strategy, as the native of Iran’s foreign policy, has been at the forefront of attention by the Iranian government. The rivalry between the two powers of Russia and Britain over the influence of Iran made the government, which was unable to influence the interventions of these powers in the internal affairs of Iran, to think of granting other European states interests in Iran. Hence, the current paper aims to examine Germany's role as the third force in Qajar foreign policy in competing against Britain and Russia. Having expanded the conceptual framework, the current paper will examine the Qajar foreign policy and its challenges in competing with Russia and the United Kingdom. This is an applied paper given the nature of the study of foreign policy. data was collected using qualitative research method, and a type of study document with the aim of achieving new perspectives in issues related to foreign policy, namely the Third power and Britain and Germany politics; the findings indicate that, firstly, the main characteristic of Iran's foreign policy during the Qajar reign, over a period of more than a century, was the Russian-Britain competition. The negative consequences of this competition gradually urged the Iranian authorities to open the door to third-party power, or another country. The pioneers of this policy (i.e., the establishment of relations with the German government) initially merely pursued a political goal, but gradually sought to benefit from the economic and humanitarian assistance of the third state to help the economy and reform the Iranian administrative system. In a period of history, the Germans managed to make the best use of this position and expand their influence in this sector with widespread involvement in the economic sector.

Key words: Iran, Qajar, Russia, Britain, Third Power Policy

INTRODUCTION

The growing trend of influence and lack of control and domestic woes led to a state of emergency in the contemporary foreign policy. Therefore, decisions were taken without regard to futurism for the purpose of escaping and removing the obstacles ahead. Because of the lack of strategy, multiple programs, without regard to the realities of that time and the conditions for success of those programs, were performed in the form of trial and error. The plan to establish relations with Germany in the foreign relations of Iran is one example. So, in line with these points, we are also trying to examine the role of Germany as the third power in Qajar foreign policy in the fight against Britain and Russia.

Qajar Foreign Policy

Governments, in line with their domestic needs, geographic and geopolitical status, and also under the influence of the structure and functioning of the international system, take specific orientations and strategies to meet their national interests and objectives. Since international politics is posited in a dynamic environment and the factors of change from all sides, one should not expect the structure of foreign policy and government orientations to remain unchanged. Sometimes these changes are slow and gradual, and sometimes are fast and structural. Iran’s foreign policy experienced its most critical historical stages in the Qajar era. The complexity of the international system, the monopoly of the division of power and the rivalry between the two powerful and veteran Russian and Britain actors in the north and south of Iran, have provided Iran with a difficult and complicated situation for diplomacy. Despite the fact that Iran’s foreign policy, with the exception of the
brief period of the Amir Kabir's leadership in Qajar era, was not strong enough and was not based on fixed and predetermined principles, but the precision of attention in Iran's diplomacy orientation led to the conclusion that Iran was influenced by the conditions of the two powerful Russian and British governments international requirements and domestic conditions following a series of general lines in their foreign policy, which in practice constituted the foreign policy of Iran in the nineteenth century. These lines include: 1. Balancing Britain's and Russia's rivalry in Iran; 2. pursuing a policy of alliance with strong European governments. 3. Adopting a Third Power Policy.

About the first principle (balancing), it should be said that it was applied between the two imperialist Russians and the British at the beginning of the 19th century. Any privilege given to one of the two rivals, it had to give aprivelege to the other for the balance. Therefore, the policy of balance in action was to the detriment of the interests of the country and only to the benefit of the ruling elites. The policy of alliance was also adopted under the conditions that Iran had been involved in conflict and war with tsarist Russia for nearly thirty years. The sovereignty of the autocratic system, the lack of legitimacy, the unpopularity of the rulers included major factors in resorting to foreigners in crisis situations to take such a policy to protect the throne. The “Third Power” policy was adopted from 1850 as a new policy in Iran. Iran hoped to seek a strong alliance among non-neighboring countries, which, as a result of the entry of third powers into the Russian and Britain competition in Iran, would reduce the pressure of these countries, but this policy was not successful because there was no third power willing to enter a dangerous competition between Britain and Russia in Iran. However, Iran stubbornly advocated the idea of resorting to the “Third Power”.

**British Policy in Iran**

Iran is a country that has always been of great importance in terms of geographical location and the reliability on some of the components of national power, which has never been reduced. The presence of water borders in the north and south of the country and its neighbors with the Russian countries and in terms of land borders in the west, the northwest and in the east and northeastern and adjacency to the countries of Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan and the presence of high mountains in the northwest and northeast as well as sandy plains in the south and the desert in the east made Iran of strategic importance for in Russia, Britain and Ottoman politics so that Iran played a crucial role in defensive measures taken by Britain in India among other Middle East countries. Iran oil played a major role for the British navy in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Iran was one of the countries that formed the first front of the regional defense circle around India. In addition, the country played a quarantine role for this vast and important British colony. Iran was a bridge between Central Asia and India, and formed an important defensive belt on the borders of India, from Balochistan (southwest) to the Persian Gulf, which is part of the Indian Ocean. Persian Gulf, in international terms, was no less important than the Suez Canal. Persian Gulf was India's center for trade and politics. The importance of Iran and the Persian Gulf was such that in 1885, an English historian named AR.Sali, writes: “It is our duty to judge every movement in Turkey, any new transformation in Egypt, any incident in Iran, in Burmese or in Afghanistan with a great deal of consciousness, because we own India. That's why we have an important position in the Asian power system, and we are particularly sensitive to the state of affairs of the countries that are on our way from Europe to India”.

Later, Lord Curzon writes: Turkistan, Afghanistan. Iran are in fact a chessboard on which the game of achievement and control over the world is played on it.” From the last century, Russia's and Britain policies in Iran were based on two principles: Russia's goal was to find access to international waters through access to the Gulf, and the Britain's goal was to prevent any common border in its subcontinent India with the land of the Russian Empire; these two principals were the determining factor in the policy of the two governments in Iran. However, despite the contradictions of the goals that brought about the conflict of interests and intense competition, the Britain and Russia colonial policy in Iran followed two common goals: First, the prevention of development and Iran's progress in all fields; second, to prevent the penetration of a third power in Iran. This geopolitical importance of Iran has always been important throughout history, but has doubled with the spread of the industrial revolution and the formation of the phenomenon of colonialism. Because Iran is a major contributor to India, British policy was inspired by India's principle of defense. This policy was a policy of competition and balance with other states that might risk its domination, while at the same time it considered the policy of peaceful intrusion and invasion of Iran itself. The Britain, worried about the situation in India, decided to establish political relations with Iran in order to prevent a possible Russian-French invasion of India, and in the end of 1799, the English officer, John Malcolm, who knew the Persian language very well was sent to Iran. AH sent to Iran. Malcolm mission was completed successfully. He signed a political-economic agreement with Iran. At the beginning of Amir Kabir appointment as chancellor, Colonel Frontier, wrote a letter to him, and raised other issues while banned on the entry of the slave by the Sea, it was, in fact, the next steps of
the colonialists towards the main goal. Therefore, the principles of Britain foreign policy in Iran can be examined in two respects: First, weakening the sovereignty of Iran from a political-economic perspective, so that it cannot indulge in the invasion of India; secondly, Iran should not be so weak that it would surrender to Russia. Given the circumstances of that time and considering that Britain and Russia were competing in that region at that time, the reasons for the Britain insistence on concluding the contract could be as follows:

1) Preventing the Russian forces to advance in Iran: because the non-stop of the war could have contributed to the presence of Russians in Iran and the collapse of the balance of power in favor of the Russians and at the expense of the British.

2) Weakening Iran to achieve India-related goals: One of the most important reasons for Britain to stay in Iran was to maintain its position in India. Without a doubt, the victory of either side of Iran or Russia in this war could have weakened Britain's position in Iran, thereby jeopardizing British interests in India. An example of this is Britain's mediation to conclude the Golestan and Turkmenchai treaties. In other words, Britain's general policy at this time was based on constant competition, while recognizing rival political freedom, preventing the emergence of a third force, and compensating overthrowing Iran's defeats in the first and second wars with Russia. In this way, short-term companionship and long-term balance policies are best seen in Britain foreign policy towards Iran. Thus, over the years, Russia suddenly overcame the Caucasus, annexed Georgia and northern Azerbaijan, and part of Armenia to its hinterland, had widespread commercial rights and massive political influence in Iran, and came closer to the India borders under the colonial rule of Britain. In the words of Firouz Kazemzadeh, the scene was decorated with the long struggle between the Russians and the Britain, a duel which was the only determinant in Central Asia and the Middle East until after World War II Britain power fell dramatically. Therefore, it can be said that the efforts of Russia and Britain to capture the affected territories, imposed many political, economic, social and geographical changes on the eastern lands and colonial lands. Iran, in the nineteenth century due to its strategic importance for the two powers of Russia and Britain, failed to overcome this pressure, with all the diplomatic efforts that took place from the beginning of the Qajar to the Constitutional Revolution to enter the third power and moderate the influence of the Russia and Britain. The two sides will be relieved, because whenever a third power comes to the fore, the conflict between them and the two would be abandoned for a short time and their agreement could also compromise Iran’s independence and consolidate their common domination over the country. Altogether, the position of these two powers in Iran created three conditions. The alignment of Russia and Britain; the establishment of a positive balance in terms of political and economic influence; the collapse of the political and economic balance to the detriment of one another.

Relations between Iran and Russia
The historical memory of the people of Iran, especially since the Qajar dynasty, has no positive impression of Russia’s relations with Iran, and the bitter memories of colonial domination and the attempt by Russian politicians to tap into economic resources remain in the minds of Iranian society. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Russia, with all its resources, was trying to expand its political influence by preserving its economic superiority in order to attain the heart of the commercial and vast wealth of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The Iranian-Russian wars in the nineteenth century, which led to the imposition of the Trekmanchay and Golestan treaties on Iran, brought the greatest military, economic, and political blow to the independence of Iran in the nineteenth century. The blows from these two treaties on Iran's independence also provided the grounds for Britain to take advantage for abuses. The nineteenth century was the century of the evolution of the domination of Imperialism. Iran, although was not the colony of any country, has always been at the center of attention of the colonialists due to its strategic location. Another point that made the situation dangerous for Iran was the Russian greed of tsarist Russia to reach international water. In the early 18th century, the Purdagh developed a doctrine for the development of its northern and southern borders. Although he did not succeed in implementing such a project, his ideals always inspired the next tsar. the will of Peter the Great reads, “Georgia and the provinces of the Caucasus are the vital arteries of Iran, and as the tip of Russia’s domination fails, a weak blood from the state of Iran will erupt. You need to seize the countries of Georgia and the Caucasus and make Iran your obedient servant.”

The Formation of a Tendency toward Germany as a Third Power
The strategy of attention to Germany as the third power at the Safavid era initially was motivated by the common interests of both countries in confronting the Ottomans, when the Safavid kings attempted to import Germany as an ally and supporter of foreign relations in Iran. The relations between Iran and Germany since the time of Shah Isma’il I (1500-1523) and his successor, Shah Tahmasb I (1576-1530), on the one hand, and the Emperor of Germany Karl V (1519 -1557), on the other hand, began to be seriously
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and motivated in the context of a common enemy. Karl V was the king of Spain before the emperor and after that became the emperor of Germany.

Shah Abbas Safavid sent Anthony Shirley and Hossein Bay Bayat in (1599) to Europe along with a delegation to join the European kings against the Ottoman Sultan and to conclude contracts for the sale of Iran silk. The delegation arrived in the fall of (1600) at the presence of the Emperor Rudolph II and received warm welcome. He accepted Shah Abbas’s proposals and sent Etienne Kakash to Iran at the head of a delegation to avoid any stop in his negotiations with the Shah of Iran. Etienne Kakash, who arrived in Iran at Loghard in (1603), was ordered by the emperor to contract with Shah Abbas, and, in particular, promised that he would not stop war with the Ottomans until Tabriz is seized.

Shah Abbas sent Robert Sherley to welcome the envoy by the emperor of Germany to Langroud, but Kakash and some of his companions died of illness on way in Lahijan. Despite this, a comprehensive report of the relations between the two empires of Iran and Germany was prepared by “Tectander” (succession of Kakash) efforts, and in (1605), and upon the return of the German delegation, the report was given to Germany emperor, after which the relations between Iran and Germany periodically continued until and through Afshar and Zand reigns. Relations between Iran and Germany have not had much coherence and ambition like relations with other European nations during this period, and this relationship continues until the second half of the Qajar government. In the early years of (1850), at the request by Amir Kabir, relations with the Germans were re-established with moderate motives. At that time, Amir Kabir sought a powerful third-party government that would establish political relations with Iran without any colonial expectation. This relation was not serious because of Germany’s lack of interest in expanding its ties with Iran at that time. The relations with Germany by this time did not fit into historical continuity for Iranians.

“Since sixty or seventy years ago, Iranian relations with the French nation has intensified, and most Iranian students went to Paris or the French part of Switzerland to complete their education, and as a result, French language and its practices spread to Iran, and students were less sent to other countries. In Germany, there were very few Iranian students, and probably not seven, eight [more] people. First, Mokhber I-Dawlah family went to Germany to study. In the recent past, the German government was connected with Iran more than before with the passing of the current war. One of his good deeds to Iran was to accept some of the youth of Iran as students. Iranians who seek development of the country are very grateful to this German school.”

Thereafter, the first diplomatic contact between Iran and Germany in the new period took place in 1857. On June 25 of the same year, the contract of commerce and friendship in Paris was signed by FarakhKhkan Aminolmolk, Ambassador of Iran to France, and Kenneth Karl Frans von Hutz Feldbinder on behalf of the German Customs Union. “the Germans interested in the treaty as a result of the commercial reports and travel notes of the German Orientalist Ernest Otto Blau, who had spent many years in the eastern countries. It is important to note that German orientalists have always been leaders on the presence in Eastern countries and studying the "Oriental issue", but due to the lack of attention of the German rulers to the research findings of these Orientalists, many of them have published their research results in the UK, Russia or France. The next step was the political delegation to Baron Julius Minotoli, who arrived in Iran in 1869 and hosted by Nasir al-Din Shah for 3 months. In addition, all Bismarck’s efforts were aimed at regulating and improving relations with Europe, in particular the Russia and he did not dream of a world empire, along with his realism foreign policy. But after dismissing him in 1890, the emperor of Germany sympathized with the policies of the German industrial economic circles. Although the adoption of a new or global policy in Germany began after the fall of Bismarck, perhaps the second phase of the German advance in Iran from late 1905 until the start of the First World War. In 1871, German Chancellor Bismarck declared the establishment of the German Empire (Second Reich) after crushing several European powers.

In the fall of 1905 two regiments of the Ottoman army raided the northwestern region of Iran. It was not the first time that there were conflicts between Iranians and Turks over these areas. This Ottoman action not only added to the turmoil of its relations with Iran, but also created a gap in Ottoman relations with Germany for five years. The possible involvement of the Russians and the Britain and the possibility of dividing the territories of the two countries in favor of these two powers caused German concern and its reflection in the country’s press. Germany inevitably involved in the conflict subject to the Iranian request and the sensitivity of the issue. In any case, mediation by Germany in the Iranian-Ottoman border dispute was very helpful to Germany’s foreign policy in Iran and led to a greater tendency of the Iranian people and Iranian figures toward that country. The attempt to establish a German bank and school in Tehran was one of the positive effects of this policy. Although the German school was established in Iran in (1907), the policy of establishing a German or national bank failed. In the fall of 1905, the Iranian government was keen on establishing more financial and commercial ties with the
German government. Probably what inspired this was the inauguration of the American Hamburg Shipping line in the Persian Gulf, which provided a more regular schedule for the arrival and departure of German ships. Germany continued the political, military and commercial presence to gain influence in Iran and gain ground in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, Germany, in its turn, tried to indirectly influence politics on the “unsettled” borders of Central Asia through the Ottomans on the Russian Empire. In particular, this was evident in the early years of the twentieth century and later in the First World War. At that time, the policies of the Germans led the Iranian public and the Iranian elites to rejoice. The disgust from the Russians and Britain and the seemingly anti-imperialist aspects of Germany in the territory of the Islamic countries and the fact that Kaiser introduced himself as a regular friend of 200 million Muslims was a policy.

In the meantime, the Ottomans were also trying to influence policies on the developments in the region based on Pan-Turkism views, and the Germans sought to find their place in the Persian Gulf and Iran were encouraging this policy with the aim of reducing Russia’s influence. At the same time, Nasser-al-Din Shah was unable to prevent the influence and intervention of the Russian and Britain representatives in the internal affairs of Iran, and sought to pay attention to Germany. Because the establishment of a friendly relationship with a third power for balancing Russia and Britain was one of the main goals of the foreign policy of the Qajar government, in addition to benefiting from the economic power of Germany for the reconstruction and reform of the economic and administrative affairs. For the same reason, in order to balance the foreign policy and maintain independence, Shah decided to engage another European state in the affairs of Iran, so that it may partly reduce the influence of the two colonial governments of Russia and Britain.

Nasser-al-Din Shah traveled to Germany on his first European trip in 1873 and he met German Chancellor Villem I, Emperor and Bismarck during his 9-day stay in that country. In the late decades of the 19th century Germany gradually emerged as a powerful emperor in the European political horizons and played a major role in the political scene of the world. Thus, in June 1873 a treaty was concluded as the first formal treaty between Iran and Germany, which was the basis for future economic relations between the two countries.

Ten years after the first official contract between the two countries, in 1883 Nasser-al-Din Shah requested the emperor of Germany to send German specialist officers to Iran to form a European style army. But the German government did not pay attention to this request by Nasser-al-Din Shah. Bismarck, the German prime minister, disagreed with this in order to maintain friendship with Russia, which he needed, believing that such an army might be used in Iran once again against Russia, and only sent two retired German officers to Iran. In 1885, following the talks, the two countries agreed to establish their political and economic representatives in each other’s capitals. In the same year, Germany created its political representative in Iran. Bismarck’s general view of Iran can be summarized as follows: “The Iranian government should be determined to advance the country, pursue political reforms, seek to maintain its independence, and set an example of Prussia and build its home, and only then can ask help of others.” Bismarck says in a letter to Nasir al-Din Shah: “Your Majesty is confident of German friendship that it will not disturb the necessity of interference and friendship, but as benevolence we tell you to not seat comfortably in the hope of support and assist of others it should not be easy to gather because the states policies are not unchangeable. Each state must be independent in its own and does not seekindependent in others.”

Mokhber-ol Saltaneh Hedayat basically states one of the main reasons for European travels of Nasir al-Din Shah: “Nasir al-Din Shah last decision when the Russian and Britain intervention was not possible to prevent was to offer other states privileges in Iran, and his travels were more from this point of view.” On the other hand, in the letter sent by Nasir al-Din Shah to the Bismarck by Ali Ghiqkhān Mokhbar al-Dawlah, the purpose of the relationship with that country was stated: “The purpose of establishing relations with that government is not to cause harm without reason or do not bother the government of Germany with the support of our government; but because we regard this government as a special friend and a neural state, we want to provide Iran with the grounds for the advancement, because the courage and magnitude of the German government is a blessing of this position, that we have chosen it among all the governments to aid in Iran advancement, and on the other hand, the neighboring states will never be in the position to assist the Iranian government to flourish to the desired point. We hope that our remarks will be considered by the German government and our friendship is considered to be pure and unparalleled.”

As mentioned above, Nasser-al-Din Shah, during his first trip to Europe in 1873, visited Germany and the Treaty of Friendship and Trade between Iran and Germany was signed on June 11, 1873. The most important issue of the treaty was the eighteenth article, which stated that “in the event of a war between one of the parties to this treaty with a third party, good will be established between the parties to the treaty and if Iran enters a war with another power,
if the Shah requests, the German government is ready to use its efforts to resolve the conflict. Accordingly, Ali Ghīqākhān Mokhbar al-Dawlah was sent to Berlin by Nasser-al-Din Shah. He carried letters from the Shah of Iran to the crown prince of Germany and Bismarck. The purpose of these trips was to attract friendship and support from the German government. Shah of Iran requested the two countries to establish embassies in each other’s capitals, and also stated that the Iranian railways would be constructed by German companies, as well as Iran’s mines under the supervision of German engineers. Having arrived in Berlin, Mokhbar al-Dawlah met Bismarck and the crown prince of Germany, which was of particular importance and was published by German newspapers.

The Germans discovered in the year 1884 that French sugar production was abundant in the Persian Gulf islands. They also imported sugar at a lower price to the Persian Gulf, but failed because Iranians did not feel the German sugar had a pleasant taste in their mouths and did not like it. Mokhbar al-Dawlah having talked with Bismarck and the crown prince of Germany and after a series of confidential correspondence the two governments decided to establish political relations and establish embassies in each other’s capitals on 1885. Mirza Reza Khan (Muid al-Saltaneh) was sent by Naser-al-Din Shah as Iran’s first ambassador to Berlin. Graphen Bronshowik also came to Iran as the first specialist and specialist minister of the German Empire to establish a German embassy in Tehran. In the same year, Nasir al-Din Shah decided to buy a ship from Germany for the Bushehr port. Hence, “Morteza Gholi Khan, Sania al-Dawlah” was commissioned to serve. He bought the Persepolis commercial ship. The ship flew from the Burferhaven shipbuilding port along with German ferries to the Persian Gulf. It was not a warship, but there were three guns of 70 mm and some balls. Persepolis ship did not perform an important mission and in practice did not operate in the Persian Gulf and the Karoun River and was abandoned. The ship cost was 3,500 English Layers per year for the Iranian government. At the same time, Russia and Britain were strongly opposed by Germany influence. In the late nineteenth century, the Emperor of Germany gradually emerged as a powerful emperor in the European political horizons and played a major role in the political world; despite this many Iranian political observers also felt that the new era of Iranian foreign policy history is begun. Thus, the tendency toward the Germans was created within the Iranian elite-both elites within the government and critics-elites. In the meantime, groups such as the Berlin Committee, formed by the Germans and composed of a number of Iranian intellectuals residing abroad, and some who had more independent figures or thought of fleeing the Russians and the British believed that perhaps this time it was possible to find a third power in the international arena, which tended to prevent Russian and British interventions. In the meantime, some of the policies of the German government, such as the proposed linkage between the Berlin-Baghdad railway and Tehran, were welcomed by a million Iranians. Although this plan was not implemented due to the growing opposition from the Russia and the Britain, it added the same to Germany’s credit to the Iranians. The Germans were well aware that due to the many political and economic hardships they could not leak into this sensitive area, they tried to pursue their policies in a non-violent and humanitarian way. German specialists came to the study under the names of technical experts, religious teachers and scholars throughout Iran. The German shipping and trading service, and the arrival of German capital, eventually transformed the country into Russia’s third largest trading partner after Russia and Britain. Iran, on the one hand, could have been in a position to threaten the interests of its rivals, Russia and Britain, and on the other hand, according to the Germans themselves, “somewhere under the sun” for economic exploitation, the study of raw materials, the export market, issuing capital and dozens of other attractions.

Third Power Policy Analysis

One of the important aspects of foreign policy was the approach to the third power, which until then had not been given serious attention in history. Establishing a relationship with these countries could free Iran’s foreign policy from the bottleneck of bilateral domination between Russia and Britain. Accordingly, the Qajar strategy’s intention to increase the number of foreign actors in the political and economic zone of Iran has increased the strength of the country’s diplomatic maneuver. And after the Qajars, it was also often increased by the arrival of a new international actor in Iran’s power against Russia and British powers. Although the traditional structure of the Qajar government did not allow such policies to be promoted. The Third Power was in fact a country used to reduce the influence of Russia and Britain powers policies. This power must have four characteristics: First, there should have been no colonial goals in Iran; Second, it should have had the strength and power to balance the other two; Third, have been interested in Iran; Fourth: the two countries of Russia and Britain also, have no hostility towards that.

Since 1850, Iran has begun to seek an alliance among the Western powers, hoping that that power would prevent the invasion of Britain and Russia. At the beginning of the Qajar period and with the power of Napoleon in Europe, France was the first country to be seriously considered in the eyes of the Iranian rulers as the third power. The numerous correspondences between Fathali Shah and Napoleon and the presence of French generals in Iran.
during the first Iran-Russian War did not last long, and that with the decline of Napoleon's European power and the problems of France in its dominant territories in Syria and Lebanon, it was out as the third power. The second most trusted government in the form of third power in the eyes of the Qajar rulers was the United States, which was an ideal counterweight to Britain and Russia, and had both of these characteristics. Germany was considered by Qajar as the third power after France and the United States, the government that could have had an appropriate policy for the third power in terms of communication and some of the environmental conditions. Reflection on Iran's foreign policy on the issue of the Third Power suggests two points: first, the pursuit of this policy would later, in addition to political, counteract the negative consequences of the competition between Russia and Britain, the percentage of the financial and humanitarian assistance of third countries to improve the economic situation in Iran and the efficiency of the administrative system of Iran. Another is that Iranian politicians usually choose state as a third power, first of all in the sense of being far from Iran, and secondly without colonial goals. The governments of France, Germany, and the United States were among the governments that were considered by the Iranian politicians as a third power. Reza Shah, did not like relationship with France, it was likely due to French problems in the territories under the control of Syria and Lebanon, as well as internal issues. On the other hand, it seemed that the United States was an ideal counterweight to Britain and Russia. Since the First World War, it has been victorious and more powerful, and according to the Iranian perceptions, it lacked a colonial tradition. In the aftermath of the war, the United States showed modesty and moderation, and in Tehran, the presence of Morgan Schuster in the prewar period and his dismissal was the result of Britain and Russian opposition. Americans differed from other Westerners. But the United States could not accept this policy, so the Germans replaced it.

CONCLUSION

The glimpse of the relations between Iran and Germany in general and during the Qajar period clearly indicates that Iran's governors from Safavid to Qajar did not understand the world situation and power relations in the international system. In order to achieve their goals, the world’s powers imposed a kind of strategy against the same powers and the weak states. But the Iranian authorities, based on the personal initiative of the dictatorship of the government in the historical context of Iran, and without the perceived overt and hidden implications of the powers sought to engage with them, and sometimes to get rid of them entered a third power into the game. While the choosing this strategy and even selecting the country that was supposed to be in the position of the third power worsened the situation due to lack of a powerful diplomacy system, which is a chronic problem in our contemporary history. Consequently, the policies adopted by them failed to meet the national interests of our country. Therefore, in the final analysis, it can be said that the context of the formation of relations between Iran and Germany in this period can be emphasized the political context of the colonial rivalries of the great powers in the Middle East, and in particular the interference of Russia and Britain in Iran, and also the need of Iranian states to balance and moderate the pressure of colonial governments. In addition, in the years under study, Germany looked at Iran as an active player in its European competitions foreign policy, and Iran was not the main target in German foreign relations.

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